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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 20, 2010, while drilling oil from the outer Continental Shelf,
the Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded, killing eleven people and spilling
more than five million gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico.' Deepwater
Horizon held the record as the deepest oil rig in history, and the oil spill it
produced is one of the largest ever.2
Fortunately, catastrophic spills like the Deepwater Horizon are not the
rule.3 Offshore operators spill millions of gallons of oil, fuel, and other
chemicals into federal waters each year.4 According to the United States
Minerals Management Service, approximately forty spills were greater than
one thousand barrels since 1964, and thirteen within the last ten years.5 Off-
shore oil extraction operations have produced some of the largest oil spills in
the world's history.6 The numbers become higher when considering oil spills
from tankers, carriers, and barges.7 As estimated by the United States Coast
Guard, 1.3 million gallons of petroleum are spilled into United States waters
1. Sheila Pulham et al., BP Oil Spill: An Interactive Timeline, GUARDIAN (Sept. 28,
2010, 11:09 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/interactive/2010/jul/08/bp-oil-
spill-timeline-interactive.
2. BP Oil Spill Is Now the Largest Ever in Gulf, CBS NEWS (July 1, 2010, 11:53 AM),
http:l/www.cbsnews.comlstofies/2010/07101/national/main6636406.shtm; Dan Shapley, So
How Big Was the BP Oil Spill?, DAILYGREEN (Sept. 21, 2010, 2:00 PM),
http://www.thedailygreen.com/environmental-news/latestbp-oil-spill-size-0528. "An inde-
pendent analysis ... puts the total spilled" at more than 180 million gallons. Id.
3. David Ivanovich & Kristen Hays, Offshore Drilling Safer, but Small Spills Routine:
Hurricanes Can Pose Particular Risks, Hous. CHRON., July 20, 2008, at Al.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R.L. 33705, OIL SPILLS IN U.S.
COASTAL WATERS: BACKGROUND, GOVERNANCE, AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 32 (2007), avail-
able at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33705-20070823.pdf. Before the Deepwater Hori-
zon, "[t]he largest accidental oil spill in world history-the IXTOC I, estimated at 140 million
gallons-was due to an oil well blowout in Mexican Gulf Coast waters in 1979." Id. at 32-
33.
7. INT'L TANKER OWNERS POLLUTION FED'N, OIL TANKER SPILL STATISTiCS: 2009, 5
(2009), available at http://www.itopf.com/information-services/data-and-statistics/statistics/
documents/Statspack2009-FINAL.pdf.
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from vessels and pipelines in a typical year.8 In addition, spill statistics are
often misleading because some incidents are not reported in the Coast
Guard's database.9
Moreover, statistics are no better when considering the rest of the
world. For example, while the Deepwater Horizon spill was still ongoing,
China experienced its largest oil spill.' ° There are also many oil spills that go
largely unnoticed, and the numbers seem to be increasing." Even if the
United States and other countries suspended deepwater drilling as a result of
the spill, East Timor, Australia and others continue to pursue "ultra-deep"
exploration. 2 Despite the experience and the moratorium that followed the
spill, deep water drilling is resuming in other wells in the Gulf of Mexico. 3
Further, British Petroleum will start drilling soon in the Mediterranean 4 and
in the Arctic Ocean. 5 Finally, the worst has yet to come: Brazil is drilling
deeper than the BP Deepwater Horizon oil rig and with fewer precautions. 6
8. Oil Spills, FUEL ECONOMY.GOV, http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/oilspills.shtml (last
visited Oct. 1, 2011).
9. RAMSEUR, supra note 6, at 32.
10. Cara Anna, China Oil Spill Doubles in Size, Called 'Severe Threat,' ASSOCIATED
PRESS, (July 21, 2010,4:02 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.comid/38337393/.
1I. See Joe Brock, Africa's Oil Spills are Far from U.S. Media Glare, REUTERS (May 18,
2010, 1:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE64G12X. "[l]ntemational media
has largely ignored the latest incidents ... in Nigeria, where the public can only guess how
much oil might have been leaked." Id.
12. East Timor Considers Deep Oil Drilling, PERTHNOw (July 26, 2010, 9:09 AM),
http:I/www.perthnow.com.auusiness/east-timor-considers-deep-oi-drilling/story-e6frg2r3-
1225896947807.
13. US Clears More Deepwater Oil Drilling in Gulf, SEA'TLE TIMES, (Mar. 12, 2011,
9:24 AM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2014476834_apusgulf
drillingbhpbilliton.html.
14. Monica Ricci Sargentini, La Bp Trivellerct in Libia a 600 km dalla Sicilia, CORRIERE
DELLA SERA, July, 25, 2010 at 13 (It.), available at http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/
2010/luglio/25/trivelleraLibia_600 dalla_Sicilia co9100725006.shtml.
15. Andrew E. Kramer & Clifford Krauss, Russia Embraces Offshore Arctic Drilling,
N.Y. T)MES, Feb. 16, 201 t, at BI.
16. John Vidal, UK Backing Loans for 'Risky' Offshore Oil Drilling in Brazil, GUARDIAN
(June 30, 2010, 11:34 AM) http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/jun/30/uk-loans-
brazil-offshore-drilling.
The platform is now operating 125km off the coast of Brazil in 1,798 metres (5,900 feet)
of water-deeper than BP's Deepwater rig that exploded in April and led to the disastrous oil
spill in the Gulf of Mexico .... [Tjhe 14-page environment report prepared by the [bank financ-
ing the drilling operations] makes no mention of blowouts or the equipment needed to prevent
them. Ministers have edited out all ECDG's comments assessing the risks involved in deep-sea
drilling in the Atlantic.
Id.; see also Editorial, Obama Underwrites Offshore Drilling, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2009, at
A16.
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In other words, the problem is more than compelling. The risk is that
the environmental damage will be irreversible. Oil has played, and still
plays, a fundamental role in the world's economy. 7 But times are chang-
ing. 8  Alternative feasible sources of energy exist' 9 -renewable, less dan-
gerous, and, most importantly, environment-friendly energy sources. 20 Still,
oil maintains its supremacy mainly because of its low cost.2' However, oil's
low cost depends on nobody being held accountable for the environmental
damages produced by oil drilling. Nowadays, different theories are raised
to support the petroleum companies' liability.2 3 Still, the United States sys-
tem owns in its arsenal one of the most powerful weapons to fight the oil
plague.24
This article will show that the common law doctrine of strict liability for
abnormally dangerous activities constitutes the best way to remedy and to
prevent further oil spills from occurring. Part H will analyze the issue of
whether federal preemption thwarts the application of state tort law. Part III
will generally describe the doctrine of abnormally dangerous activities and
its application in Florida. Finally, Part IV will argue that offshore oil drilling
is an abnormally dangerous activity.
17. See John W. Schoen, BP Spill Clouds Future of U.S. Drilling, MSNBC.coM (May
28, 2010, 9:36 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37389981/ns/business-oil-andCenergy/.
18. See id.
19. Sharon Begleymay, How Quickly We Forget, NEWSWEEK (May 7, 2010),
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/05/07/how-quickly-we-forget.html.
20. Id.
21. See id.
22. See David Rosenberg, The Judicial Posner on Negligence Versus Strict Liability:
Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 120 HARV. L. REV. 1210, 1216
(2007) ("Under strict liability, firms price their products to include not only the costs of pro-
duction and reasonable care, as they would under the negligence rule, but also the cost of
accidents from unavoidable residual risk."); see also Ruwantissa Abeyratne, The Deepwater
Horizon Disaster-Some Liability Issues, 5 TUL. MAR. L.J. 125, 127 (2010).
23. Abeyratne, supra note 22, at 127. "At the time of writing, questions continued to
emerge as to who was liable for the spill, and it was reported that the United States Depart-
ment of Justice opened both civil and criminal investigations into the occurrence." Id.
24. See id. at 128, 149 (starting the analysis on oil spill liability with the acknowledgment
that "[t]he United States is a common law jurisdiction," and then concluding that a defen-
dant's liability "could be determined on the basis of fault liability or strict liability.").
[Vol. 35
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1. A VALID COMMON LAW CLAIM
A. A Preliminary Issue: Why Common Law Should Not Be Preempted
An issue preliminary to the present discussion concerns federal preemp-
tion. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution states that federal law "shall
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby. 25  Thus, pursuant to the Constitution, federal law could
preempt the application of the state common law, frustrating any chance to
establish tort liability.26 Historically, federal and state laws have supple-
mented the common law standards of liability in many instances.27 Congress
has regulated oil pollution through piecemeal legislation, 8 and entrusted
federal agencies have enacted a large body of regulations to supplement
those rules.29
However, even when federal law regulates harmful activity through ex-
tensive and comprehensive prohibitions, state common law can maintain its
fundamental role of "gap filler."3 In particular, there are compelling reasons
why the common law of torts should not be preempted.3 First, tort law pro-
vides an alternative basis to recover both compensatory and punitive damag-
es, even when relief would be unavailable under statutory law. 2 Moreover,
common tort law operates to protect different-but complementary-
25. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
26. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 103-6, at 917-21 (1st Sess. 1992).
Article VI states that the federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby." Id.
27. William K. Jones, Strict Liability for Hazardous Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1705,
1742 (1992). "For example, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act provides for strict liabil-
ity for clean-up costs . I..." ld  (footnote omitted).
28. See Ambrose 0. 0. Ekpu, Environmental Impact of Oil on Water: A Comparative
Overview of the Law and Policy in the United States and Nigeria, 24 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 55, 65 (1995). The author lists several federal statutes: the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabili-
ty Act (CERCA); Clean Water Act (CWA); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA); Oil
Pollution Act (OPA); Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA); Coastal Zone Management Act
(CZMA); Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPAA); Migratory Bird Treaty Act
(MBTA); Deepwater Port Act (DPA);and the Ports and Waterways Safety Act (PWSA). Id. at
65 n.51.
29. Id. At a federal level, a non-exclusive list includes the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Department of Transportation (including the Coast Guard), the Army Corps of
Engineers, the Department of Interior, and the Minerals Management Service. Id. at 65 n.54.
30. Sandra Zellmer, Preemption by Stealth, 45 Hous. L. REV. 1659, 1673 (2009).
31. See id.
32. Id.
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interests than public law, such as morality, reciprocity, and most importantly,
distributive justice.33
Finally, preserving common law remedies may promote economic effi-
ciency. 34 Tort liability forces the purveyors of risky activities to bear the cost
of harm caused by the activity.35  The companies engaged in abnormally
dangerous activities will spread such costs by raising the prices of their
products.36 That would make the consumers aware of the true costs of pro-
duction, including the environmental costs, and enable them to make in-
formed purchasing decisions.37 When damage awards make the existing
practice too expensive, the producer is motivated either to improve the prod-
uct or take the product off the market.38 Considering the importance of pe-
troleum in our society, it is unlikely that oil companies would choose the
latter option; it is more than fair, however, to force such companies to pay
for the harm caused while pursuing their profits.39
The foregoing was underlined in United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc.,n° where
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, upholding a penalty for an oil
spill, observed:
[T]he party engaged in the potentially polluting enterprise is in the
best position to estimate the risk of accidental pollution and plan
accordingly, as by raising its prices or purchasing insurance. Eco-
nomically, it makes sense to place the cost of pollution on the en-
terprise ... which statistically will cause pollution and in fact does
cause pollution.41
Accordingly, imposing common law strict liability has the collateral ef-
fect of requiring oil companies to account for the harm produced by their
33. Id. (stating that "[s]ocietal norms of reciprocity, distributive justice, morality, and
punishment for careless or malicious deeds undergird tort law") (footnote omitted).
34. Robert L. Glicksman, Federal Preemption and Private Legal Remedies for Pollution,
134 U. PA. L. REV. 121, 194 (1985).
35. Zellmer, supra note 30, at 1673.
36. See id.; see also David C. Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Failure, 33 PEPP. L.
REV. 95, 101 (2005) (identifying the threat of liability as an important source of market discip-
line).
37. Glicksman, supra note 34, at 194; Zellmer, supra note 30, at 1673-74.
38. Zelimer, supra note 30, at 1674.
39. See Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Alloca-
tion of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REv. 713, 718 (1965). "Activities are made more expensive, and
thereby less attractive, to the extent of the accidents they cause. In the extreme cases they are
priced out of the market." Id.
40. 589 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1978).
41. Id. at 1314-15 (footnotes omitted).
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activities, with the final, auspicious result of rendering the alternative energy
sources more feasible.42 Based on the foregoing, the applicability of the
common law should not be preempted.
B. The Rules for Preemption
It is a well-established principle of constitutional law that "'any state
law . . . which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.'
43
This principle makes no distinction between federal statutes and federal
regulation by a government agency; federal regulations have the same pre-
emptive effect as federal statutes when they are enacted according to the
congressional mandate.44 However, under preemption principles it appears
crystal clear that neither federal law nor federal regulation would preempt
Florida tort law in this case.
Federal pre-emption may be either expressed or implied.45  Express
preemption results when the federal legislation contains explicit pre-emptive
language.46 In the absence of such express language, the Supreme Court of
the United States has distinguished two types of implied preemption.47 Field
preemption-when the "federal regulation is 'so pervasive ... that Congress
left no room for the States to supplement it,"' 4 and conflict preemption-
when compliance with both the federal and the state regulation would be
physically impossible, 9 or when application of the state law would interfere
with the realization of the full purpose and objectives of Congress. 0
The congressional purpose, then, is the "ultimate touchstone.' 5 Where
there is an overlap between federal and state law, however, the latter is pre-
sumed valid "'unless [preemption] was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.' 5 2 Thus, this presumption must be rebutted to preempt a state
42. See Calabresi, supra note 39, at 716 ("Treating the problems of accident law in terms
of activities rather than in terms of careless conduct is the first step toward a rational system of
resource allocation.").
43. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (quoting Felder v.
Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988)).
44. Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-54 (1982).
45. Gade, 505 U.S. at 98.
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. Id. (citing De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153).
49. Id. (citing Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963)).
50. Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
51. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
52. Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
2011]
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law. 53 Preempting a common law theory of recovery is usually more diffi-
cult.5 4 Finally, the result seems easier when the federal law contains an ex-
press savings clause, designed to leave to the states the power to regulate the
matter.55
Oil polluters invoked the foregoing principles as a protection from lia-
bility for oil spills in interstate waters; however, courts have correctly chosen
to preserve state law remedies.56
C. No Federal Statutes Overcome the Presumption Against Preemption
1. Clean Water Act
The first statute to consider is the Clean Water Act (CWA). Section
132 1(b)(3) of CWA prohibits any person from discharging into or upon wa-
ters of the United States any harmful quantity of oil.57 Violation of the pro-
hibition or failure to comply with the federal government's directives regard-
ing cleanup operations triggers liability for civil penalties.58 However, noth-
ing in the Act expressly preempts state law; in fact, the contrary is true.
CWA contains an explicit saving clause that prevents any interpretation prec-
luding state authority.59 As written, CWA is only an alternative channel to
seek recovery. 60 Express preemption, then, has to be excluded.
53. See id.
54. See United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993). "In order to abrogate a com-
mon-law principle, the statute must 'speak directly' to the question addressed by the common
law." Id. (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)).
55. See Zellmer, supra note 30, at 1660.
56. Id. at 1678.
57. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) (2006).
58. Id. § 1321(b)(6)(A)(i)-(ii).
59. Id. § 1321(o)(2). This section specifically addresses oil spills; under the title "[L]ocal
authority not preempted" states:
(1) Nothing in this section shall affect or modify in any way the obligations of any owner or
operator of any vessel ... onshore facility or offshore facility to any person or agency under
any provision of law for damages to any publicly owned or privately owned property resulting
from a discharge of any oil ... or from the removal of any such oil.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as preempting any State ... from imposing any
requirement or liability with respect to the discharge of oil . . . into any waters within such
State, or with respect to any removal activities related to such discharge.
Id.
60. In re Complaint of Allied Towing Corp., 478 F. Supp. 398, 403 (E.D. Va. 1979)
(concluding that nothing in CWA "conflicts with or otherwise preempts any state statute...
imposing liability" nor "limit the amount of that liability," but "merely provides the states
with an alternative federal remedy" assuring the preservation of "the natural resources of this
country"); accord Baker v. Hazelwood (In re Exxon Valdez), 270 F.3d 1215, 1231 (9th Cir.
[Vol. 35
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Any attempt to imply preemption will lead to a similar conclusion.
Congress did not intend CWA penalties for water pollution to occupy the
entire field of pollution remedies. 6' Through its saving clause, CWA was
designed to maintain the common law theories.6" Thus, there is no field
preemption. Moreover, the common law does not conflict with the federal
regulation, the former providing an easier way to punish the same harmful
conduct.' First, it is not physically impossible to comply with both.65 In
fact, strict liability under common law will enter into play only when the
statute is already violated by an unlawful oil spill. Second, applying the doc-
trine of abnormally dangerous activities to oil spills aims at the same purpose
that CWA tries to obtain.66 The principal purpose of this section is to deter
harmful oil spills. 67 Such a goal will be accomplished, rather than ob-
structed, by considering deepwater oil drilling an abnormally dangerous ac-
tivity. 68 Finally, the legislative history indicates a lack of congressional in-
tent to preempt state law.69 Accordingly, CWA should not preempt the state
common law.
2001) ("[Tjhe Clean Water Act does not preempt a private right of action for punitive as well
as compensatory damages for damage to private rights.").
61. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2619 (2008).
62. See id. (CWA is "expressly geared to protecting 'water,' 'shorelines,' and 'natural
resources' and was not intended to "eliminate sub silentio oil companies' common law duties
to refrain from injuring the bodies and livelihoods of private individuals.").
63. Id.
64. See In re Complaint of Allied Towing Corp., 478 F. Supp. 398, 403 (E.D. Va. 1979).
65. See id.
66. See infra Part III.
67. Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327, 1350 (D.P.R. 1978), aff'd in
part and vacated in part by 628 F.2d 652 (1 st Cir. 1980) (citing United States v. Atil. Richfield
Co., 429 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1977) aff'd sub nom. United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 573
F.2d 1303 (3d Cir. 1978)); At. Richfield Co., 429 F. Supp. at 837 ("Congressional purpose...
was to impose a standard of conduct higher than that related just to economic efficiency"); see
33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1) (2006); see also United States v. Oswego Barge Corp. (in re Com-
plaint of Oswego Barge Corp.), 673 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 1982) (The "only purpose [of the oil
spill cleanup provisions of this section] is to create a precise remedy solely for the United
States to recover specified damages pursuant to a carefully devised formula.").
68. See Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Cae-Link Corp., 622 A.2d 745, 758 (Md.
1993). "To the extent that the action does not otherwise thwart the goal of the [CWA], the
savings clause does preserve state law remedies." Id. at 756.
69. For instance, the Senate Report of the 1977 CWA amendments, in the relevant part,
contains the following comments:
The committee considered amendments to section 311 to establish liability for damages
occurring outside the jurisdiction of any State as a result [of] an oilspill, including compensa-
tion for income loss due to damages to property or natural resources. A related amendment
creating a new compensation fund.., was also considered. The committee deferred action on
these proposals and will consider them as part of the comprehensive oilspill liability legisla-
20111
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This rationale was followed by the appellate court in the Exxon Valdez
oil spill.7" The jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages to fisher-
men and landowners injured by the oil spill under Alaskan law.7' Since OPA
does not retroactively apply to spills before 1990, Exxon argued that CWA
and federal admiralty law preempted common law damages awards.72 The
Ninth Circuit considered CWA savings clause and left the private tort claims
intact.73 The Supreme Court affirmed.74  Some of the same reasons apply
when considering the next statute.
2. Oil Pollution Act
As a response to the Exxon Valdez wreck in 1989, which caused an oil
spill of eleven million gallons into the coastal waters of Alaska, Congress
enacted the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) in 1990.71 OPA substantially expanded
the existing regulation concerning oil spills. 76 It also imposed strict liability
for parties responsible for oil spills.7 7 In enacting OPA, preemption was the
most discussed point.78 In the last version of the OPA, Congress included
two savings clauses almost identical to those contained in CWA.79 Thus,
Nothing in [the OPA] shall ... be construed ... as preempting
the authority of any State ... from imposing any additional liabili-
ty or requirements with respect to the discharge of oil or ... any
removal activities in connection with such a discharge,
80
tion. In that context, the provision of liability for damages and a compensation fund which
does not preempt [s]tate liability requirement would be appropriate.
S. REP. No. 95-370, at 65 (1977), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326.
70. See Zellmer, supra note 30, at 1679.
71. Baker v. Hazelwood (In re Exxon Valdez), 270 F.3d 1215, 1225 (9th Cir. 2001).
72. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1226, 1228.
73. See id. at 1231.
74. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2633-34 (2008). The Court re-
manded the case to remit the award to the "punitive-to-compensatory ratio of 1:1." Id. at
2634.
75. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2720 (2006); Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2613.
76. Michael D. Driscoll, Note, United States v. Massachusetts: Federal Preemption of
State Oil Spill Statutes, 32 TUL. MAR. L.J. 607, 611 (2008).
77. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)(A); see Driscoll, supra note 76, at 611.
78. S. REP. No. 101-94, at 17 (1989). Preemption was discussed "more than any other
single issue" by the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee. Id.; see also Russell
v. Randle, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Its Provisions, Intent, and Effects, 21 ENVT. L.
REP. 10119, 10133 (1991).
79. See 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a), (c).
80. Id. § 2718(a).
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And,
Nothing in this Act ... shall in any way affect, or be construed to
affect, the authority of the United States or any State ... to impose
additional liability or additional requirements; or to impose, or to
determine the amount of, any fine or penalty.., for any violation
of law; relating to the discharge, or substantial threat of a dis-
charge, of oil.81
Since its enactment, federal courts have rejected OPA preemption of
common law tort claims for damages to natural resources. In United States
v. Locke,s3 the Supreme Court ultimately interpreted the scope of the savings
clauses. 84 The unanimous Court limited the state power to regulations im-
posing additional liability relating to oil spills. 85 The Court reasoned:
Placement of the saving clauses in Title I of OPA suggests that
Congress intended to preserve state laws of a scope similar to the
matters contained in Title I of OPA, not all state laws similar to the
matters covered by the whole of OPA or to the whole subject of
maritime oil transport. The evident purpose of the saving clauses
is to preserve state laws which, rather than imposing substantive
regulation of a vessel's primary conduct, establish liability rules
and financial requirements relating to oil spills.
86
Finally, the Court also acknowledged that it has "upheld state laws im-
posing liability for pollution caused by oil spills" and specified that the deci-
sion "preserves this important role for the States, which is unchallenged
here. 87 By coincidence, the cite was to a Florida case: Askew v. American
81. Id. § 2718(c).
82. See, e.g., Clausen v. MA' New Carissa, 171 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1133 (D. Or. 2001);
Williams v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 115 F. Supp. 2d 561, 565 (D. Md. 2000); Dostie Dev.,
Inc. v. Arctic Peace Shipping Co., No. 95-808-CIV-J-MMP, 1996 WL 866119, at *3 (M.D.
Fla. Aug. 14, 1996); Nat'l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia v. Moran Mid-Atlantic Corp., 924 F.
Supp. 1436, 1447-48 (E.D. Va. 1996) (rejecting plaintiffs argument that the OPA allowed
recovery in excess of the statutory limit and concluding that the OPA preserves state law
claims for those damaged by the spill but not for other responsible parties seeking contribution
claims from third parties).
83. 529 U.S. 89 (2000).
84. Id. at 105-06.
85. Id. at 106.
86. Id. at 105.
87. Id. at 106 (citing Askew v. Am. Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 332
(1973)).
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Waterways Operators, Inc.,88 in which the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the Federal Water Quality Improvement Act did not preempt
state law, because of two similar saving clauses.89 The court explained that:
[T]here need be no collision between the Federal Act and the Flor-
ida Act because ... the Federal Act presupposes a coordinated ef-
fort with the States, and any federal limitation of liability runs to
'vessels,' not to shore 'facilities.' That is one of the reasons why
the Congress decided that the Federal Act does not pre-empt the
States from establishing either 'any requirement or liability' res-
pecting oil spills. 90
At the time of the Askew decision, OPA had not been enacted yet; how-
ever, the Court applied the same rationale in Locke and refused implied
preemption.9 In sum, the Court's view of OPA's saving clauses does allow
state law-including state common law-as a supplemental source of liabili-
ty for oil spills.92 Accordingly, although it is worth noting that British Petro-
leum is facing, among others, a lawsuit filed under CWA by three environ-
mental groups of citizens for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill,93 neither CWA
nor OPA preempts state common law.94
III. THE DOCTRINE OF ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITY
A. Ultrahazardous Strict Liability in the United States
1. Rylands v. Fletcher: The Seminal Case
Strict liability for ultrahazardous activities was first established in the
English case Rylands v. Fletcher.95 The idea set forth in Rylands is simple:
Someone conducting an activity on his own property, "which he knows will
be mischievous if it gets on his neighbour's," must pay for the damage
88. 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
89. Id. at 328-29.
90. Id. at 336.
91. See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 105-06 (2000); Askew, 411 U.S. at 336.
92. Locke, 529 U.S. at 105.
93. Environmental Groups Sue BP Under Clean Water Act, CIRCLE OF BLUE (June 7,
2010), http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/20 10/world/north-america/environmental-
groups-sue-bp-under-clean-water-act/.
94. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008); see also Locke, 529 U.S.
at 105.
95. Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng-
land).
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"which ensues if he does not succeed in confining it to his own property. '96
In other words, some activities are so risky that those who engage in them
will be liable for the consequences of loss of control over the activities, re-
gardless of whether they were carried on without wrongful conduct.
97
Ironically, Rylands itself involved a spill; the defendant's reservoir
flooded on to the plaintiff's adjoining land.98 The defendant was not negli-
gent, but the Court found the defendant strictly liable, stating:
[T]he true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes
brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to
do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does
not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is
the natural consequence of its escape. 99
After an initial hostility to the Rylands principle, American courts began
to adopt the doctrine, imposing strict liability even in absence of negli-
gence. 0° In the earliest cases applying Rylands, strict liability involved two
components: first, the abnormal danger of certain activities;'' and second,
the fairness of imposing the cost for the harm resulting from the activity on
the actor rather than on unrelated parties.1
0 2
Those components were still more evident in the first decision applying
strict liability for oil drilling." 3  In Green v. General Petroleum Corp.,'
0 4
96. Id. at 340.
97. See Kevin Case, Note, Tanks in the Streets: SUVS, Design Defects, and Ultraha-
zardous Strict Liability, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 149, 177 (2006).
98. Rylands, 3 L.R.E. & I. App. at 332.
99. Fletcher v. Rylands, (1866) 1 L.R. Exch. 265, 279. On appeal, the opinion was af-
firmed, with additional language referring to the defendant's "non-natural use" of his land.
See Rylands, 3 L.R.E. & I. App. at 339.
100. Compare Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442, 448 (1873) (holding that no "legal principle
can throw so serious an obstacle in the way of progress and improvement"), with Green v.
Gen. Petroleum Corp., 270 P. 952, 956 (Cal. 1928) (holding "in all fairness" that oil drilling
was an inherently hazardous activity). "Typical early cases involved the storing of nitroglyce-
rin, exploding oil wells, and blasting operations." Case, supra note 97, at 178.
101. See, e.g., Bradford Glycerine Co. v. St. Marys Woolen Mfg. Co., 54 N.E. 528, 531
(Ohio 1899) (considering the dangerousness of storing nitroglycerine).
102. See, e.g., Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54 F.2d 510, 514 (2d Cir. 1931). In
Exner, the court stated:
When ... the defendant, though without fault, has engaged in the perilous activity of storing..
. explosive[s] for use in his business.. . there is no justification for relieving it of liability, and
•.. the owner of the business, rather than a third person who has no relation to the explosion,
other than that of injury, should bear the loss.
Id.
103. See Case, supra note 97, at 179; see also Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The
Revitalization of Hazardous Activity Strict Liability, 65 N.C. L. REV. 257, 264 (1987) (sug-
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where the plaintiff's injury was caused by the defendant's exploding oil well,
the Supreme Court of California imposed liability on the defendant, stating:
Where one, in the conduct and maintenance of an enterprise lawful
and proper in itself, deliberately does an act ... and injury is done
to the other as the direct and proximate consequence of the act,
however carefully done, the one who does the act and causes the
injury should, in all fairness, be required to compensate the other
for the damage done.
105
Several years later, in Luthringer v. Moore,'06 the same court explained
its holding in Green stating, "The important factor is that certain activities
under certain conditions may be so hazardous to the public generally, and of
such relative infrequent occurrence, that it may well call for strict liability as
the best public policy.' 0 7
Accordingly, both components were present in the court's analysis, and
the court eventually held in favor of the plaintiff.10 8 The fairness component
was more explicit in Green than in the previous cases.' °9 However, the First
Restatement of Torts and the Second Restatement of Torts apparently re-
strained the breadth of the doctrine, making its application more unpredicta-
ble.'l°
2. The Restatement (First) of Torts: Common Activities
The First Restatement of Torts embraced strict liability for ultrahazard-
ous activity. " ' An activity was "ultrahazardous" when it "(a) necessarily
involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others which
gesting a theory of enterprise liability: "[Sitrict liability properly applies to business enter-
prises that benefit from hazardous activities and can spread losses among the whole communi-
ty.").
104. 270 P. 952 (Cal. 1928).
105. Green, 270 P. at 955.
106. 190 P.2d I(Cal. 1948).
107. Id. at8.
108. Green, 270 P. at 956.
109. See Case, supra note 97, at 179.
110. See id.; see also Nolan & Ursin, supra note 103, at 265.
111. RESTATEMENr OFTORTS § 519 (1938). This section provided:
[O]ne who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable to another whose person, land or chat-
tels the actor should recognize as likely to be harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of the
activity for harm resulting thereto from that which makes the activity ultrahazardous, although
the utmost care is exercised to prevent the harm.
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cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care, and (b) is not a mat-
ter of common usage."
' 12
By excluding the activities of "common usage" from strict liability,
even when ultrahazardous, the Restatement limited the expansion of the doc-
trine to new areas, such as driving cars and operating railroads.' 13 The doc-
trine's practical significance was reduced to a minimum." 4 However, in the
decades after the promulgation of the Restatement, courts revitalized the
strict liability principle, circumventing the "common usage" restraint. 
1 5
The courts did so by narrowly defining the activity under adjudication
and considering the overall circumstances in such a way as to make it "un-
common.""11 6 An example of the former is Luthringer v. Moore,"7 where the
Supreme Court of California imposed strict liability on a defendant who en-
gaged in pest control. 1 8 The plaintiff was harmed during the fumigation
activities as a result of a gas leak."19 The court applied the First Restatement
in defining fumigation as a "specialized activity" and considered the fact that
professional fumigators were "few in number."'
2 0
Similarly, a "common usage" activity becomes abnormally dangerous
in particular circumstances.i2 ' For example, in Koos v. Roth, 22 the Supreme
Court of Oregon distinguished agricultural field burning from everyday
backyard burning.' 3 Both fire related activities involved "destruction of raw
material by oxidation," but the "scale" and the "location" made the basic act
of burning leaves ultrahazardous; field burning was found abnormally dan-
gerous because it created hazards "beyond the ordinary risks associated with
common uses of fire."' 24  Thus, an otherwise ordinary activity may be
deemed abnormally dangerous when it is carried out in an ultrahazardous
manner. 125 Thus, in In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litigation, 26 strict lia-
bility was proper even though service stations were considered a matter of
common usage; the District Court of the Virgin Islands stated:
112. Id.§ 520.
113. See Nolan & Ursin, supra note 103, at 266.
114. See Case, supra note 97, at 180.
115. See Nolan & Ursin, supra note 103, at 270.
116. See Case, supra note 97, at 193.
117. 190 P.2d I (Cal. 1948).
118. Id. at9.
119. Id. at3.
120. Id. at8.
121. Case, supra note 97, at 193.
122. 652 P.2d 1255 (Or. 1982).
123. Id. at 1265.
124. Id.
125. See Case, supra note 97, at 193.
126. 846 F. Supp. 1243 (D.V.1. 1993).
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It may well be, as Defendants contend, that operation and
ownership of service stations is a matter of common usage and that
it is not unusual today to find service stations in residential areas.
But where, as here, the risk of seepage is contamination of the
area's precious and limited water supply, locating the storage tanks
above the aquifer created an abnormally dangerous and inappro-
priate use of the land.
127
The court considered, but ultimately ignored, the commonality of the
activity in light of the surrounding circumstances. 28 The "common usage"
limitation, then, was emptied of its substantial significance.'2 9
3. The Restatement (Second) of Torts: Confusion with Negligence
Finally, the Second Restatement of Torts modified the doctrine at least
in its formal aspects. 3 ° First, it labeled the activities "abnormally danger-
ous," as opposed to the older "ultrahazardous.' 31 Second, under the refor-
mulation, strict liability must be imposed after considering six factors that
determine whether the activity is abnormally dangerous. 32 An activity is
abnormally dangerous when some of the following factors exist:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person,
land or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable
care;
127. Id. at 1269.
128. See id.
129. See Case, supra note 97, at 180; see also Gerald W. Boston, Strict Liability for Ab-
normally Dangerous Activity: The Negligence Barrier, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 597, 615
(1999). "[T]aken literally, the provision rarely limits the range of activity qualifying as ultra-
hazardous." Id.
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-520 (1977). See Boston, supra note 129,
at 616-24.
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977). According to the drafters, "A com-
bination of the factors ... is commonly expressed by saying that the activity is 'ultrahazard-
ous,' or 'extra-hazardous."' Id. § 520 cmt. h. The American Law Institute modified the name
of the doctrine, but the substance remained the same. See Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d
799, 802 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975). In this article, however, the three terms are used inter-
changeably.
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
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(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried
on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its
dangerous attributes.' 
33
The first four clauses are generally derived from the First Restatement;
only factors (e) and (f) seem to be new. 134 But while the restyling appears to
restrict the application of strict liability because of the two additional factors,
the test is substantially unchanged.135 The fulfillment of just a few of the
factors is still enough to find an activity abnormally dangerous. 136 Addition-
ally, the Second Restatement reduced the burden on the plaintiff to prove a
risky activity by using "reasonable care" in factor (c) instead of the previous
"utmost care" and requiring the courts to consider the "extent to which" the
activity is not a matter of common usage, "rather than categorically exclud-
ing common activities."
' 137
Moreover, as both courts and commentators have noted, the new factors
(e) and (f) suggest a theory more similar to negligence than to strict liabili-
ty. 138 While not expressly rejecting the Restatement, some courts and com-
mentators have shown hostility toward this approach ignoring those two fac-
tors when engaging in an abnormally dangerous activity analysis.
39
For instance, in Koos v. Roth,'40 the Supreme Court of Oregon held that
a farmer burning his fields was strictly liable for the harm caused to a neigh-
bor by the fire. 14 1 Acknowledging the "appropriateness" of agricultural field
burning to its location, the court expressly declined to consider factor (e),
stating that "an activity is not otherwise immune from strict liability because
133. Id
134. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-20 (1977), with RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF TORTS § § 519-20 (1938).
135. See Case, supra note 97, at 180.
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. f (1977). The Restatement explains
that "the factors listed in Clauses (a) to (f) of this Section are all to be considered, and are all
of importance.... [l]t is not necessary that each of them be present, especially if others weigh
heavily." Id.
137. Case, supra note 97, at 181-82; see also Nolan & Ursin, supra note 103, at 272.
138. See Nolan & Ursin, supra note 103, at 272-73; Boston, supra note 129, at 624; Case,
supra note 97, at 182.
139. See, e.g., Koos v. Roth, 652 P.2d 1255 (Or. 1982); Yukon Equip., Inc. v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1978); see also Boston, supra note 129, at 662.
140. 652 P.2d 1255 (Or. 1982).
141. Id. at 1261, 1263.
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it is 'appropriate' in its place."' 142 Likewise, the "value of the dangerous ac-
tivity to the community" was irrelevant to the court's decision. 143 The court
emphasized that the proper inquiry was "who shall pay for harm that has
been done""'4 and further noted that "the person conducting the activity can
choose whether or not to chance the potentially costly consequences... [but]
[t]he potential victim cannot make that choice."' 145 Accordingly, factor (f)
was ignored, and the touchstone was again the fairness of requiring a person
who engages in the risky activity to pay the costs.1
46
Further illustrating this approach, in Enos Coal Mining Co. v. Schu-
chart,147 the Supreme Court of Indiana rejected the argument that the defen-
dant's blasting activity was "necessary" and stated, "A business should bear
its own costs, burdens, and expenses of operation, and these should be distri-
buted by means of the price of the resulting product and not shifted, particu-
larly, to small neighboring property owners for them to bear alone."'
48
In Siegler v. Kuhlman,"49 the Supreme Court of Washington considered
the transportation of gasoline abnormally dangerous. 5° The court focused on
the nature of risks created by the tanker, referring to its "uniquely hazardous
characteristics" and "extraordinary dangers deriving from sheer quantity,
bulk, and weight, which enormously multiply its hazardous properties.''
The court also considered fairness, "putting the burden where it should be-
long as a matter of abstract justice, that is, upon the one of the two innocent
parties whose acts instigated or made the harm possible."' 52 As it appears,
the two components of the original doctrine as established in Rylands were
present in each of these cases.
53
Further, the Supreme Court of Washington in Langan v. Valicopters,
Inc.,54 expressly criticized factor (f), writing:
As a criterion for determining strict liability, this factor has re-
ceived some criticism among legal writers .... § 520(f) is not a
142. Id. at 1263.
143. Id. at 1261.
144. Id.
145. Koos, 652 P.2d at 1262-63.
146. See id, at 1262.
147. 188 N.E.2d 406 (Ind. 1963).
148. Id. at 408.
149. 502 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1972) (en banc).
150. Id. at 1184.
151. Id.
152. ld. at 1185.
153. See Case, supra note 97, at 184.
154. 567 P.2d 218 (Wash. 1977) (en banc).
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true element of strict liability: "The justification for strict liability,
in other words, is that useful but dangerous activities must pay
their own way."
There is no doubt that pesticides are socially valuable in the
control of insects, weeds and other pests. They may benefit socie-
ty by increasing production. Whether strict liability or negligence
principles should be applied amounts to a balancing of conflicting
social interest [of] the risk of harm versus the utility of the activity.
In balancing these interests, we must ask who should bear the loss
caused by the pesticides.
In the present case, the Langans were eliminated from the or-
ganic food market for 1973 through no fault of their own. If crop
dusting continues on the adjoining property, the Langans may nev-
er be able to sell their crops to organic food buyers. Appellants, on
the other hand, will all profit from the continued application of
pesticides. Under these circumstances, there can be an equitable
balancing of social interests only if appellants are made to pay for
the consequences of their acts.' 55
The Langan court declared that the test of the Restatement, as adopted
in Siegler, was met; it listed all six factors, but substantially disregarded
them. 5 6 Fairness, then, was still determinative.
Finally, before turning to the adoption of the doctrine in Florida, the
confusion created by the application of factor (c) of the Restatement deserves
some clarifying words. Factor (c) requires the "inability to eliminate the risk
of the activity by exercising reasonable care." '157 Apparently, following the
rationale set forth in Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Co. v. American Cyana-
mid Co., 5 8 some argued that factor (c) should be interpreted as depriving the
doctrine of abnormally dangerous activities of any significance. 59
155. Langan, 567 P.2d at 223 (citations omitted).
156. Id. at 222.
157. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 520 (c) (1977). The Restatement requires
the "inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care," but this proposition is
doubtful. See id. Every activity creates at least some minimal risk. This is recognized in the
change from "utmost care" in the First Restatement to "reasonable care" in the Second Res-
tatement and by the stated rationale that "probably no activity, unless ... perhaps the use of
atomic energy, from which all risks of harm could not be eliminated by the taking of all con-
ceivable precautions" Id. cmt. h. Thus, as discussed below, the standard of care is immaterial.
The proper focus then is on the dangerousness of the activity carried on.
158. 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990).
159. See generally Boston, supra note 129; Peter M. Gerhart, The Death of Strict Liability,
56 BUFFALO L. REV. 245 (2008).
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In Indiana Harbor Belt, a railroad tank car containing acrylonitrile
leaked and spilled the dangerous chemical.' 6° The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit had to decide whether a spill of dangerous chemicals occur-
ring during transportation should be subject to strict liability. 161 Writing for
the court, Judge Posner reversed the district court's decision; finding strict
liability, 162 Posner stated the now famous principle: "The baseline common
law regime of tort liability is negligence. When it is a workable regime, be-
cause the hazards of an activity can be avoided by being ... nonnegligent,
there is no need to switch to strict liability.' 63 Then, Posner suggested that
the six factors be analyzed in the following order of importance: (c), (e), (f),
(a), (b), and finally (d).' 64 Ultimately, the Court concluded in favor of a find-
ing of negligence, because the plaintiff offered "no reason . . . for believing
that a negligence regime [was] not perfectly adequate to remedy and deter, at
reasonable cost, the accidental spillage of acrylonitrile from rail cars.
,1 65
Subsequent to this decision, at least one commentator argued that factor (c)
requires the impossibility of proving negligence.
66
However, considering as the first issue whether the defendant could
have eliminated the risk by using reasonable care should not automatically
end the analysis and preclude strict liability.1 67 On the contrary, as several
authors have pointed out, "the unavoidability of the danger may suggest that
those conducting the activities are better situated than victims to spread,
avoid, and internalize this type of lOSS.,,168 Explaining the importance of the
six factors, the Court in Indiana Harbor Belt also recognized that some acci-
dents could be avoided merely by using care and that these situations require
moving the activity to another location or reducing its scale:
By making the actor strictly liable-by denying him in other words
an excuse based on his inability to avoid accidents by being more
160. Ind. Harbor Belt R.R., 916 F.2d at 1175 (7th Cir. 1990).
161. id. at 1177.
162. Id. at 1183.
163. Id. at 1179.
164. See id.
165. Ind. Harbor Belt R.R., 916 F.2d at 1179.
166. See, e.g., Boston, supra note 129, at 632-33.
167. Joseph H. King, Jr., A Goals-Oriented Approach to Strict Tort Liability for Abnor-
mally Dangerous Activities, 48 BAYLOR L. REv. 341, 366 (1996) ("The imposition of strict
liability should be driven by the central goals of this doctrine. If the defendant is a suitable
party from the standpoint of loss-spreading, loss reduction, and loss allocation, then strict
liability may be appropriate. Moreover, even when the materialization of a risk may have
been reasonably preventable, that fact may not be readily provable by the victim, especially in
violent occurrences or highly unusual activities.").
168. Id. at 366; see also Jones, supra note 27, at 1752; Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 1216.
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careful-we give him an incentive, missing in a negligence regime,
to experiment with methods of preventing accidents that involve
not greater exertions of care, assumed to be futile, but instead relo-
cating, changing, or reducing (perhaps to the vanishing point) the
activity giving rise to the accident.
1 69
Thus, Judge Posner himself centered the analysis on the extent to which
an activity, even when undertaken with all reasonable care, maintains an
unavoidable residual risk requiring the recourse to strict liability. 170 Now, an
activity can be risky either because it is hard to control or because the effects
threatened by a loss of control are extremely dangerous.'7 ' Focusing on the
level of care the defendant might have used can be misleading and lead to
absurd outcomes. 172 How can an activity that is abnormally dangerous in the
absence of negligence become less dangerous when the defendant is negli-
gent? Thus, the emphasis must be on the magnitude of the damages that may
ensue if the activity goes wrong, which generally remains equal regardless of
the defendant's conduct.'73
Further, another deficiency of the negligence regime is that the proof is
generally unavailable to the injured party. 74 The Indiana Harbor Belt court
itself was unable to identify whose carelessness caused the spill. 75 Requir-
ing a casual plaintiff to wait for each defendant "to point a finger at the oth-
ers in an effort to shift the blame for an accident" would be profoundly un-
169. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R., 916 F.2d at 1177.
170. Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 1213.
171. See Case, supra note 97, at 188.
172. Id.
173. See id. at 189. As characterized by the district court, the spill in Indiana Harbor Belt
"forced the temporary evacuation of about 3000 people" and "contaminated not only the
ground, but also the water beneath it, thus threatening the water supply" of several communi-
ties. Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co., 662 F. Supp. 637 (N.D. II1. 1987),
rev'd, 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990).
174. Jones, supra note 27, at 1752 (noting that "[i]f a bystander had been injured in Indi-
ana Harbor, she would have had to trace this carload of acrylonitrile from the supply of the
railroad car by North American Car Corporation, to the loading of the car in Louisiana by
American Cyanamid, to the movement of the car to Chicago by the Missouri Pacific Railroad,
to the handling of the car in the yard of the switching road, Indiana Harbor.").
175. Id. at 1752-53 ("The court was of the opinion that the leak of acrylonitrile 'was
caused by carelessness-whether that of the North American Car Corporation in failing to
maintain or inspect the car properly, or that of Cyanamid in failing to maintain or inspect it, or
that of the Missouri Pacific when it had custody of the car, or that of the switching line itself
in failing to notice the ruptured lid, or some combination of these possible failures of care."').
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fair. 176 Rather, strict liability provides incentives for reducing the risks at the
outset, resulting in more certain accountability in case of an accident.
177
Several courts have understood and applied this interpretation, properly
focusing the analysis on the dangers imposed by the activity, coupled with
the victim's lack of relation with such activity. 78 This also seems to be con-
sistent with the spirit of the Restatement, that explained with admittedly un-
clear language, "The essential question is whether the risk created is so un-
usual, either because of its magnitude or because of the circumstances sur-
rounding it, as to justify the imposition of strict liability for the harm that
results from it, even though it is carried on with all reasonable care."'
179
In short, the doctrine of abnormally dangerous activities-as reformu-
lated by the Restatement-can be, and was in fact construed by the great
majority of jurisdictions, as reduced to two basic themes. 80 First, the dan-
gers created to the community by engaging in the risky activity under partic-
ular circumstances; and second, the fairness of imposing liability on those
engaged in such risky activity for their own benefit.' 8' Florida courts have
followed this approach.
B. Abnormally Dangerous Activities in Florida
The Supreme Court of Florida adopted the Rylands doctrine in the case
of Pensacola Gas Co. v. Pebley. 82 In Pebley, the defendant gas company
176. Id. at 1753.
177. As suggested by one author:
Cases might of course arise in which the negligence rule would eliminate all risk. But there is
no need to choose between strict liability and negligence in such cases because both would
produce identical deterrent effects: the defendant would invest in reasonable care to avoid all
risk of accident. At the other extreme, cases might arise in which the negligence rule would
not eliminate all risk, but the defendant lacks options to reduce activity level, even by raising
price. The two rules again produce the same deterrent effect: the defendant would invest in
reasonable care, leaving a residuary of unavoidable risk. In short, courts do not need to choose
between rule regimes because strict liability works in all cases: it will be effective when it is
needed and do no harm when it is not.
Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 1217.
178. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 994 So. 2d 1062, 1066 (Fla. 2008) ("Strict liability
does not concern itself with whether the actor exercised reasonable care."); Laterra v. Treast-
er, 844 P.2d 724, 731 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992) (considering suicide with gas an abnormally dan-
gerous activity even if the defendant-suicidal was negligent); Siegler v. Kulhman, 502 P.2d
1181, 1185 (Wash. 1972) (en banc) (disregarding anyone's negligence in light of the extreme
danger posed by hauling gas on the highway).
179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. f (1977).
180. See Case, supra note 97, at 187.
181. See id.
182. 5 So. 593 (Fla. 1889).
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polluted the plaintiffs water as a result of its operations.183 The court indi-
rectly applied the Rylands principles to solve the case, stating that:
The appellant gas company had the right to use the water in and
about the gas-works as they pleased, but they had no right to allow
the filthy water to escape from their premises, and to enter the land
of their neighbors. It was the duty of the company to confine the
refuse from their works so that it could not enter upon and injure
their neighbors, and if they did so it was done at their peril; the es-
cape of the refuse filthy water being in itself an evidence of negli-
gence on the part of the gas company.
184
Even if the court imposed a sort of strict liability, the negligence lan-
guage used by the court blurred the extent of the two components revealed in
the English case. 185 Eighty-six years later, however, in Cities Service Co. v.
State,186 the Florida's Second District Court of Appeal imposed strict liability
over a defendant that caused vast damages by accidentally discharging phos-
phate lime into the Peace River.187 The court held, "The doctrine of Rylands
v. Fletcher should be applied in Florida."' 188 Expressly adopting Rylands, the
court applied the doctrine as reformulated by the Restatement of Torts, sec-
tion 519 and 520.189 Before reaching the six factors analysis, the court stated:
[E]ven the non-negligent use of one's land can cause extensive
damages to a neighbor's property. Though there are still many ha-
zardous activities which are socially desirable, it now seems rea-
sonable that they pay their own way. It is too much to ask an in-
nocent neighbor to bear the burden thrust upon him as a conse-
quence of an abnormal use of the land next door.'
90
Thus, the court first perceived that an innocent person should not suffer
the consequences of the abnormally dangerous activity.' 9' After briefly ba-
lancing the six factors, the court further admitted its reliance on one factor in
particular: the great risk of harm. 92 In its words, the court was "impressed
183. Id. at 595.
184. Id.
185. See id.
186. 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
187. Id. at 800.
188. Id. at 801.
189. Id. at 802-03.
190. Id. at 801.
191. Cities Serv. Co., 312 So. 2d at 801.
192. Id. at 803.
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by the magnitude of the activity and the attendant risk of enormous dam-
age."' 193 Additionally, the Florida court reasoned that one who carries on the
risky activity should bear the loss, rather than the victim, who had no relation
to the activity other than being injured by it.194 Thus, the court seemed to
recognize the importance of the two elements: dangerousness of the activity
and fairness of accounting the carrier for the risks. 195
The fairness component was also considered in Bunyak v. Clyde J. Yan-
cey and Sons Dairy, Inc., 96 where the court applied the Restatement analy-
sis.' 97 In Bunyak, liquefied cow manure flowed from defendant's farm onto
plaintiff's land. 98 The trial court refused to impose strict liability, and the
Florida's Second District Court of Appeal reversed.' 99 Remarkably, after
discussing the six factors and finding strict liability proper, the court returned
to emphasize the fairness component, writing at the very end of its decision:
"The conclusion is inescapable that no matter what theory is invoked by a
plaintiff whose property is damaged by the lawful activities conducted upon
or conditions existing on the land of another, the key consideration will al-
ways be that useful but dangerous activities must pay their own way. ' 2°°
In Great Lakes Dredging and Dock Co. v. Sea Gull Operating Corp.,°1
although rejecting plaintiffs contention that strict liability was proper, the
Florida court focused its analysis again on the magnitude of harm, consider-
ing that it was "[c]entral to [the abnormally dangerous activity] doctrine...
that the ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous activity poses some physical
... danger to persons or property in the area, which danger must be of a cer-
tain magnitude and nature. 20 2 Other decisions followed the same ratio-
nale.2°3 Further, in United States v. Stevens,2°4 the Supreme Court of Florida
recently reaffirmed the immateriality of the standard of reasonable care in the
abnormally dangerous activity analysis.205 The court expressly stated that
193. Id.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. 438 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
197. Id. at 894-95.
198. Id. at 893.
199. Id. at 893, 896.
200. id. at 896.
201. 460 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
202. Id. at513.
203. See, e.g., Old Island Fumigation, Inc. v. Barbee, 604 So. 2d 1246, 1248 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1992) (per curium) (holding that fumigation was an "ultrahazardous activity").
204. 994 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 2008).
205. Id. at 1066 n.2.
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"[s]trict liability does not concern itself with whether the actor exercised
reasonable care. 206
C. Defenses
Finally, we have to direct some of our attention to an issue common to
each jurisdiction: defenses that might exclude strict liability.0 7 The modem
statutory trend is to set aside those defenses. 208 Even when imposing strict
liability, federal statutes limit the defenses available to the plaintiff.2°9 State
statutes are even more rigid and disallow all or most defenses. 20 According
to the Restatement, one who engages in an abnormally dangerous activity "is
subject to strict liability for the resulting harm although it is caused by the
unexpectable (a) innocent, negligent or reckless conduct of a third person, or
(b) action of an animal, or (c) operation of a force of nature. ' 21' Following
this trend, in Old Island Fumigation, Inc. v. Barbee,2 '2 Florida's Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal stated:
Any alleged negligence by a third party does not free the fu-
migation company from liability. In a case involving ... an ultra-
hazardous activity, this court held that "[u]nder Florida law, a de-
fendant is still liable for the consequences of his conduct even
though some other cause contributed to the same damage." 213
Still applying the Restatement, the court agreed that when the risk re-
sults in an injury, "it is immaterial that the harm occurs through the unex-
pectable action of a human being, an animal or a force of nature... irrespec-
tive of whether the action of the human being [who partakes in] the abnor-
mally dangerous activity harmful is innocent, negligent or even reckless. '1 4
The modern trend, and especially the Second Restatement approach, seems
correct.215 In the absence of some fault on the part of the victim, strict liabili-
206. Id.
207. See Jones, supra note 27, at 1743.
208. Id.
209. See Christopher B. Kende, Development And Presentation Of The Pollution Victims'
Claim, 5 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 203, 210 (1993) ("The [contributory] negligence of the United
States... is no longer available under OPA.").
210. Jones, supra note 27, at 1743.
211. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 522 (1977).
212. 604 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (per curium).
213. Id. at 1248 (citations omitted).
214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 522 cmt. a (1977). However, the Restatement
expressed no opinion on deliberately harmful behavior by third parties. See id.
215. Jones, supra note 27, at 1744.
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ty justly requires anyone conducting an abnormally dangerous activity to
bear the burden of the resulting accident.
216
At this point, the groundwork has been laid to show that offshore oil
drilling is an abnormally dangerous activity, especially because it is per-
formed in circumstances that render it extremely dangerous, such as drilling
in deep water without sufficient technology.
IV. DEEPWATER OIL DRILLING Is ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS
When considering oil related activities, jurisdictions are split. 217 On
one end of the spectrum, some courts have refused to consider mere transpor-
tation of petroleum an abnormally dangerous activity.2 8 However, at least
one jurisdiction deemed the danger created by an oil spill during such trans-
portation an "extraordinary" risk of harm.219
On the other end, strict liability was found appropriate in oil drilling sit-
uations similar to blasting activities. 20 As noted in Green v. General Petro-
leum Co., an oil well exploded during drilling operations, causing damages
to the plaintiff.22 The Supreme Court of California found strict liability "re-
gardless of any element of negligence either in the doing of the act or in the
construction, use, or maintenance of the object or instrumentality that may
have caused the injury. 222 Of course, accidents like the one in the Gulf of
Mexico are comparable to this kind of conduct.
In the middle category, very few courts have yet to decide whether oil
drilling-regardless of the location-is an abnormally dangerous activity.223
216. Seeid. at 1755.
217. See Smith v. Mid-Valley Pipeline Co., No. 3:07-CV-13-KKC, 2007 WL 1309612, at
*3 (E.D. Ky. May 4, 2007). "[N]o Kentucky case has extended strict liability to the transmis-
sion of oil through pipelines." Id. (quoting Cantrell v. Marathon Ashland Pipe Line, LLC, No.
03-298, 2005 WL 1570652, at *3 (E.D. Ky. June 30, 2005)).
218. Smith, 2007 WL 1309612 at *3.
219. See, e.g., In re Complaint of Weeks Marine, Inc., No. 04-494, 2005 WL 2290283, at
*6 (D. N.J. Sep. 20, 2005). "The Court does not find that [plaintiff] has demonstrated that the
risk of harm imposed on the community by [operating a crane] is 'extraordinary,' in contrast,
for example, to the danger posed by oil spills or the transporting of hazardous substances." Id.
220. Green v. General Petroleum Co., 270 P. 952, 956 (Cal. 1928).
221. Id. at953.
222. Id. at 955.
223. See EOG Resources, Inc. v. Badlands Power Fuels, LLC, 673 F. Supp. 2d 882, 900
n.3 (D. N.D. 2009). "Only the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has squarely answered the
question of whether oil well drilling is an ultrahazardous activity." Id. (citing Hull v. Che-
vron U.S.A., Inc., 812 F.2d 584, 586 (10th Cir. 1987) (finding "that oil well drilling is an
ultrahazardous activity")). Cf Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 563 n.3 (9th Cir. 1974)
("We decline to reach the issue of whether defendants' oil drilling operations constitute an
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It is time, then, to consider each of the six factors' applicability to deep water
oil drilling. At the end of the analysis-which will keep an eye on Florida
law-it will appear both logical and just to consider the petroleum compa-
nies accountable for such a remunerative, yet dangerous, activity. Under
Florida law, oil drilling performed in deepwater must be subject to strict lia-
bility as matter of law.224 And such conclusion is supported by those deci-
sions that have already considered oil drilling as an ultra hazardous activi-
ty-regardless the location. 5
A. It Is Likely to Produce Great Harm: Factors (a) and (b)
"The greater the risk of an accident ... the stronger is the case for strict
liability. /22 6 Factors (a) and (b) can be considered together. 2 7 In conjunc-
tion, these two factors represent the dangerousness of the activity-probably
the most relevant part.228 In Cities Service Company v. State,2 9 Florida's
Second District Court of Appeal dwarfed all the other factors, emphasizing
"the magnitude of the activity and the attendant risk" of harm and explained
why such magnitude was great:
The impounding of billions of gallons of phosphatic slimes behind
earthen walls which are subject to breaking even with the exercise
of the best of care strikes us as being both 'ultrahazardous' and
'abnormally dangerous,' as the case may be.
'ultrahazardous activity' and express no opinion as to the applicability of this doctrine to the
facts presently before us.").
224. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520, cmt. f (1977). When the activity's
"dangers and inappropriateness for the locality" are great enough, "[the carrier] should be
required as a matter of law to pay for any harm it causes, without the need of a finding of
negligence." Id. But see SKF Farms v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. Rptr. 497, 499 ( Cal Ct. App.
1984) ("[B]y its very nature, the issue of whether an activity is ultrahazardous cannot be de-
cided on demurrer."); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. City of Redondo Beach, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d
337, 344 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) ("Given the peculiar facts.., the location of the drilling activi-
ty and the importance of the breakwater to the safety ... we cannot say, as a matter of law,
that respondents' drilling was not ultrahazardous.").
225. See, e.g., Franks v. Indep. Prod. Co., 96 P.3d 484, 492 (Wyo. 2004) (citing Pan
American Petroleum Corp. v. Like, 381 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 1963) (Wyoming law recognizes that
the drilling of an oil and gas well is an ultrahazardous activity, a dangerous agency); But see
Ainsworth v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 829 F.2d 548, 550 (5th Cir. 1987) (concluding that drilling
operations are not ultrahazardous).
226. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir.
1990).
227. See Boston, supra note 129, at 655.
228. See Case, supra note 97, at 186.
229. 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
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This is not clear water which is being impounded. Here, Cities
Service introduced water into its mining operation which when
combined with phosphatic wastes produced a phosphatic slime
which had a high potential for damage to the environment. If a
break occurred, it was to be expected that extensive damage would
be visited upon property many miles away. In this case, the dam-
age, in fact, extended almost to the mouth of the Peace River,
which is far beyond the phosphate mining area described in the Ci-
ties Service affidavit. We conclude that the Cities Service slime
reservoir constituted a non-natural use of the land such as to in-
voke the doctrine of strict liability. 230
Considering the potential dangerousness of the activity as the main
point of the analysis, the court focused on the environmental damage.231 The
other factors appeared almost irrelevant once the risk of harm resulting from
the activity was on a large enough scale.232 However, strict liability is proper
either when there is little chance of great harm or when such a risk is high
but the magnitude of harm threatened is low.
233
In the case of oil drilling, both the risk that an oil spill will occur and
the magnitude of the harm that results once it occurs are gigantic. As to the
risk that some damage will result, as previously discussed, oil spills are more
than common. 234 As to the severity of harm, during an interview with the
Financial Times, Tony Hayward, British Petroleum's Chief Executive Offic-
er, acknowledged that the company considered the blowout a "low probabili-
ty, high impact event. 2 35 Thus, the magnitude of harm in the case of an oil
spill may be monumental, and often irreparable.236 Indeed, BP spilled more
than one hundred and forty million gallons into the Gulf waters and killed
eleven people as a result of the rig's explosion. 37
230. Id. at 803 (emphasis added).
231. See id.
232. Boston, supra note 129, at 656.
233. See id.
234. See Ivanovich & Hays, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
235. Sean Alfano, BP CEO Tony Hayward Admits Company Didn't Have The Right Tools
to Stop Gulf Oil Spill, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 3, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/
news/national/2010/06/03/2010-06-03_bpceojtony-hayward-admits company-didnthave_
theright-tools to stop-gulf oil s.html.
236. See generally Bruce B. Weyhrauch, Oil Spill Litigation: Private Party Lawsuits and
Limitations, 27 LAND & WATER L. REV. 363 (1992); Ekpu, supra note 28, at 61.
237. See Tracking the Oil Spill in the Gulf, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 2, 2010,
http:/www.nytimes.cominteractive/201 5 /01us/201 0501 -oil-spiII-tracker.htmi.
'The total amount spilled was estimated to be 140 million gallons... of crude oil." Id.
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In particular, deepwater oil drilling creates a risk upon the environment,
human health, and some economic activities that are water related.
I. Effect on Aquatic Life
Oil pollution affects the aquatic life in different ways. First, the conse-
quences of large oil spills are directly lethal to marine organisms like cor-
als, 238 shrimps, 239 and any other kind of animals including birds and mam-
mals. 240 Second, even when life forms are not killed immediately, the oil can
indirectly destroy the fauna by impairing fish "feeding efficiency, growth
and reproductive rates, survival of offspring, and resistance to diseases. 24'
Additional known effects are "disturbance of the food chain and 'direct
coating' which impedes the vital processes of respiration ... in animals, pre-
vents sunlight penetration to plants, and increases temperature by absorbing
solar radiation.2 42 In fact, oil itself can impact coastal plant species by the
mere effects of touching and smothering.2 43
Finally, the long-term effects of oil on the marine ecosystem are still
unknown. 244 In particular, the exact effects on the deep-sea life from the oil
that dissolved below the surface-like the way with which such a dissolution
takes place-are "still a mystery." 245 Nonetheless, when discussing the ex-
tent of the environmental damages, scientists concur that oil in water is
harmful .24
238. See John C. Rudolf, Deep Underwater, Threatened Reefs, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2010
at A] 6. "Studies on the effects of oil and chemicals on coral are limited to the shallow-water
variety, however. Essentially no research has been conducted on their slow-growing deepwa-
ter cousins." Id.
239. Bob Anderson, Shrimpers Watch Winds; Crisis Persists *** Concerns Raised About
Oil Spreading into Three Lakes, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., June 15, 2010, at Al.
240. DISASTERS: OIL SPILLS, http://www.pollutionissues.con/Co-Ea/Disasters-Oil-
Spills.html#ixzz0uzKw6lko (last visited Oct. 1, 2011). "900 bald eagles, 250,000 seabirds,
2,800 sea otters, and 300 harbor seals were killed directly by the Exxon Valdez spill... [how-
ever,] population-level consequences are difficult to measure." Id.
241. Id.
242. Ekpu, supra note 28, at 63.
243. Rudolf, supra note 238, at A16.
244. Id.
245. Justin Gillis & Campbell Robertson, On the Surface, Gulf Oil Spill Is Vanishing Fast;
Concerns Stay, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2010, at Al. See also http://www.nytimes.com/
gwire/201 0/08/24/24greenwire-undersea-oil-plume-vanishes-in-gulf-degraded-b-8739 I .html?
pagewanted=all.
246. See Ekpu, supra note 28, at 61-62. "There has not always been a consensus ... on
the exact effects of oil pollution on water.... [l]t is generally agreed that petroleum in water
is harmful, even though the extent of the harm may not be agreed upon." Id.
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2. Effect on Human Health
Likewise, there is some dispute about the potential effects of the spilled
oil on human health.247 However, some damages are evident.248 First, for
instance, a direct result of the spill: Eleven workers died on April 20, 2010,
when the Deepwater Horizon went up in flames. 249 Second, the effects aris-
ing from the exposure to the oil spilled: Many of the chemicals extracted
from crude oil are "carcinogenic, mutagenic and teratogenic. 25° While brief
contact with small quantities of light crude oil is not harmful, ingesting a
minimal amount of oil will cause "upset stomach, vomiting, and diarrhea. 25'
Long-term exposures can affect the central nervous system.252 A 2007 study
following cleanup damages after the 2002 Prestige oil spill in Galicia, Spain,
showed that respiratory symptoms might arise years after the exposure. 3
Skin and respiratory disorders were also common symptoms after the Exxon
Valdez oil spill, in 1989.254 Other potential long-term risks include lung,
kidney, liver, and DNA damage. 255 Significant steps have been taken to in-
crease the knowledge about the longer-term effects of oil exposure. 256 Final-
ly, it is difficult to estimate the catastrophic impact-mental, physical, and
emotional-that the spill will have on the people currently living in the Gulf,
and on the generations to come. 7 Overall, few would disagree that the risks
posed on the human health by oil spills are abnormally dangerous.
247. See Shari Roan, Gulf Oil Spill: Human Health Effects Debated, L.A. TIMES, June 4,
2010, 5:09 PM) http://atimesblogs.latimes.com/greenspace/2010/06/experts-speculate-on-
likely-human-health-effects-of-oil-spill.html.
248. See generally Walsh & THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY infra.
249. Brian Walsh, Assessing the Health Effects of the Oil Spill, TIME (June 25, 2010),
http:// www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1999479,00.html.
250. Ekpu, supra note 28, at 64 n.47. Benzene, toluene, and butylene are three of the most
dangerous.
251. Noaki Schwartz & Matthew Brown, Gulf Oil Spill Sickness: Cleanup Workers Expe-
rience Health Problems, Complain of Flulike Symptoms, HUFFINGTON POST, June 3, 2010,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com2010/06/03/gulf-oil-spill-sickness-c n_598816.html.
252. Id.
253. Melly Alazraki, The Oil Spill and Human Health: More Questions Than Answers,
DAILY FIN., June 26, 2010, http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/health-effects-of-oil-spills-on-
humans-more-questions-than-an/i19530364/?icid=spherecopyright.
254. See id. "[O]nly seven spills have been studied of the hundreds around the world." Id.
255. Id.
256. Alazraki, supra note 253. "[T]he Department of Health and Human Service has set
aside $10 million to track oil spill-related illnesses in states along the Gulf Coast and study
cleanup workers." Id.
257. Walsh, supra note 249. As a consequence of the catastrophe, "'[tihese are people in
a serious crisis."' Id. For instance, an Alabama fisherman with an oil-spill cleanup job for
BP, was recently found "dead from a self-inflicted gunshot wound." Id.
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3. Economic Loss
Finally, oil spills result in the impairment of large zones of water that
were once used for recreation, navigation, or livelihood.25 8 Thus, depending
on its size, an oil spill may affect commercial fishermen, beach owners and
users,259 tourist booking agents, waterfowl guides and photographers,26 fish-
ing industry employees, and commercial fish processors.261 Water contami-
nation also impairs recreational activities like swimming or water surfing.262
And the list is absolutely non-exhaustive.
Such economic interests were traditionally unprotected: Strict liability
permitted only recovery for harm to persons, real property, or chattels. 263
Logically, these damages should have been included within the scope of
strict liability because they directly result from the abnormally dangerous
activity. 2 4 However, some courts limited the imposition of strict liability for
recovering economic loss.26'
In Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC,2 66 the Supreme Court of Florida
solved the issue consistently with the letter of the Restatement. 267 In Curd,
the defendant spilled pollutants into Tampa Bay. 26 8 The plaintiffs-fishermen
sued for both negligence and strict liability, claiming loss of income or prof-
it.2 69 The court first explained the applicability of the economic loss rule,
stating:
[Tihe economic loss rule in Florida is applicable in only two situa-
tions: (1) where the parties are in contractual privity . . . or (2)
where the defendant is a manufacturer or distributor of a defective
258. See Ekpu, supra note 28, at 61.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See Weyhrauch, supra note 236, at 372-75.
262. Id. at 372
263. David C. McIntyre, Note, Tortfeasor Liability For Disaster Response Costs: Ac-
counting For The True Cost of Accidents, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 1001, 1030-32 (1987).
264. Id. The Restatement apparently supports this conclusion, distinguishing between
"harm" and "physical harm" and applying strict liability to "harm." Id. Therefore, liability
for economic loss should not excluded by the rule. See id.
265. In re TMI Litig. Gov'tl Entities Claims, 544 F. Supp. 853, 857-58 (M.D. Pa. 1982),
vacated sub nom. Pennsylvania. V. Gen. Pub. Utils. Corp., 710 F.2d 1171 (3d Cir. 1983)
(holding that "purely economic losses" are not recoverable on a strict liability theory without a
showing that the losses flowed from harm to persons, land or chattel).
266. 39 So. 3d 1216 (Fla. 2010).
267. Id. at 1228.
268. Id. at 1218.
269. Id. at 1219.
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product which damages itself but does not cause personal injury or
damage to any other property.
Clearly neither the contractual nor products liability economic loss
rule is applicable to this situation .... Rather we have plaintiffs
who have brought traditional negligence and strict liability claims
against a defendant who has polluted Tampa Bay and allegedly
caused them injury .... [Tihe economic loss rule does not prevent
the plaintiffs from bringing this cause. The plaintiffs' causes of
action are controlled by traditional negligence law ... and by strict
liability principles.7 0
Then, the court went on to apply the principle to the plaintiffs' negli-
gence claim and found "a protectable economic expectation in the marine life
that qualifies as a property right. '271 Finally, the court held in favor of the
plaintiffs, concluding:
[D]ischarge of the pollutants constituted a tortious invasion that in-
terfered with the special interest of the commercial fishermen to
use those public waters to earn their livelihood. We find this
breach of duty has given rise to a cause of action sounding in neg-
ligence. We note, however, that in order to be entitled to compen-
sation for any loss of profits, the commercial fishermen must prove
all of the elements of their causes of action, including damages.
272
It must be noted that although the court avoided the issue of strict liabil-
ity, it cited to two oil spill cases in reaching its conclusion.273 The court's
holding, then, seems to be broader than it appears. Whether Curd would
protect the special interest of surfers and swimmers-in addition to that of
fisherman-is an issue beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, at this
point, it seems clear that economic losses must be taken into account when
considering the severity of the harm threatened by engaging in the activity.
Therefore, the magnitude of the risk that either an oil spill will occur or
that irreparable damages will result in the event of a spill is enormous and
sufficient to justify the enhanced protection provided by strict liability prin-
ciples.
270. Id. at 1223.
271. Curd, 39 So. 3d at 1224.
272. Id. at 1228 (emphasis added).
273. See id. at 1223-24. Cf Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974); Bur-
gess v. MV Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247 (S.D. Me. 1973).
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B. No Standard of Reasonable Care Can Be Exercised: Factor (c)
Another factor to consider is whether the risk of injury can be avoided
through the exercise of reasonable care.274 One may argue that using reason-
able care can eliminate the risks of oil drilling. However, as previously dis-
cussed, this is not the proper question because the defendant's conduct is
irrelevant in a strict liability analysis.275 The relevant inquiry is whether the
magnitude of the danger is the same regardless of one's fault.2 76 Oil drilling
is dangerous regardless of whether or not negligence accompanies it. First, it
is likely that an oil spill may occur; in fact, it is almost the rule.277 Second,
when such a spill does occur in the deep sea, the resulting harm to the envi-
ronment-and not only the environment-is intolerable, regardless of any
potential negligence. The difficulties in closing the spill increase with the
depth.27 8 Finally, even an accurate estimation of the real damage becomes
hard.279 Accordingly, the argument against strict liability will likely fail.
C. The Activity Is Not a Matter of Common Usage: Factor (d)
The more the activity is customary, the less it is abnormally dangerous.
An activity is a matter of common usage when it is habitually "carried on by
the great mass of mankind or by many people in the community.' '280  Oil
drilling, even when conducted on land or in shallow waters, certainly does
not fit within this definition. Thus, this factor also weighs in favor of strict
liability.
In any event, as we have seen before, the fact that an activity is a matter
of common usage is rarely outcome determinative.28' The significance of
factor (d) can be limited by narrowly defining the activity involved. 282 Simi-
274. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(c) (1977).
275. Calabresi, supra note 39, at 716.
276. Case, supra note 97, at 188.
277. See Ivanovich & Hays, supra note 3.
278. See Peter N. Spotts, Gulf oil spill: Why Is It so Hard to Stop?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, June 8, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0608/Gulf-oil-spill-Why-is-it-
so-hard-to-stop. See also Kristen Hays, BP to Test New Cap to Stem Oil Flow, REUTERS, July
13, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6505TA20100713.
279. See John Collins Rudolf, On the Surface, Gulf Oil Spill Is Vanishing Fast; Concerns
Stay, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2010, http:/lwww.nytimes.comi/2010/07/28/us/28spill.html?
_r=-2&pagewanted=2&hp.
280. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. i (1977).
281. See Boston, supra note 129, at 659; Case, supra note 97, at 193.
282. To recall, in Koos v. Roth, the court distinguished agricultural field burning from
everyday backyard burning, applying strict liability to the latter. 652 P.2d 1255, 1265-66 (Or.
2011]
33
Spinaci: Lessons From BP: Deepwater Oil Drilling is an Abnormally Dangerou
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAW REVIEW
larly, an otherwise ordinary activity can be found abnormally dangerous
when it is carried out in a dangerous manner.283 Accordingly, even assuming
that oil drilling could be considered an activity of common usage, deepwater
oil drilling is certainly not. In fact, while oil is commonly drilled in-land or
in coastal waters, offshore deepwater facilities have found their way only
recently. In the Gulf of Mexico there are approximately three thousand and
five hundred drilling wells and production platforms, yet few reach a depth
of one thousand feet.284 With a vertical depth of 35,050 feet (10,680 m) and
a measured depth of 35,055 feet (10,685 m), the Deepwater Horizon is the
deepest oil rig in history.285 Not only was the activity not common, it was
actually a world record of uncommonality. 286 This conclusion is completely
consistent with the Restatement approach, adopted in Florida: "[A]bnormal
dangers arise from activities that are in themselves unusual, or from unusual
risks created by more usual activities under particular circumstances. 287
It seems apparent that the overall risks produced by drilling in such
deeper water are much greater than normal.288
D. Off-Shore Oil Drilling Is Inappropriate for the Location
Conducting an activity in the wrong place can render such activity ab-
normally dangerous. 289 In Florida, the proper inquiry is whether the activity
is a "non-natural" use of the land.290 However, a different community may
turn a dangerous activity, such as oil drilling, into a natural use of the land;
this situation occurred, for example, in a few cases of properly conducted
operations of oil wells in Texas and Oklahoma.2 9' However, even such cases
1982). In Luthringer v. Moore, pest control was considered professional fumigation and
found abnormally dangerous. 190 P.2d 1, 6-7 (Cal. 1948).
283. See Case, supra note 97, at 193.
284. lan Urbina, In Gulf It Was Unclear Who Was in Charge of Rig, N.Y. TIMES, June 5,
2010, http://www.nytimes.conV2010/06/06/us/06rig.html.
285. Press Release, Transocean Ltd, Deepwater Horizon Drills World's Deepest Oil &
Gas Well (Sept. 2, 2009) (on file with Nova Law Review).
286. See id.
287. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. f (1977).
288. See Urbina, supra note 284.
289. See Boston, supra note 129, at 661; Case, supra note 97, at 193.
290. See Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799, 803 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.1975). "The
conclusion is, in short, that the American decisions, like the English ones, have applied the
principle of Rylands v. Fletcher only to the thing out of place, the abnormally dangerous con-
dition or activity which is not a 'natural' one where it is." Id. at 802 (quoting W. PROSSER,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 78 510 (4th ed. 1971)).
291. See Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W. 2d 221 (Tex. 1936); Tidal Oil Co. v. Pease,
5 P.2d 389 (Okla. 1931).
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are distinguishable. In Turner v. Big Lake Oil CO., 2 9 2 the Supreme Court of
Texas held that oil drilling was a natural use of land in Texas and refused to
impose strict liability for harm caused by the escape of salt water wastes
from oil drilling operations. 93  Similarly, in Tidal Oil Co. v. Pease,294 the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma found the location for oil drilling operations
appropriate.295 However, the court in Tidal stressed that the touchstone for
determining the appropriateness of the location is the possibility of injuring
others or the land of others.296 Although this possibility is reduced to a min-
imum in rural and isolated land areas, engaging in the very same conduct in
places where it may affect other people can transform such conduct into an
abnormally dangerous activity.297
If oil spills in the open sea the risk of harm to third parties is at its
greatest; as discussed, the injury would reach a large number of different
victims, from landowners to just users of the marine resources. 298  But the
reasons why offshore deepwater is inappropriate for oil drilling are more
compelling. 299 Not only is deepwater oil drilling more likely to cause acci-
dents,3" but also the depth of the sea makes solving problems that may arise
more difficult.0 1 Scientists have compared working in the deep sea to work-
ing in space: "It's a hard place to get to, a tricky space in which to maneuv-
er, and subject to daunting laws of physics. 30 2
292. 96 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. 1936).
293. See id. at 226.
294. 5 P.2d 389 (Okla. 1931).
295. Id. at 392-93.
296. Id. at 391.
297. Compare Turner, 96 S.W.2d at 221 with Green v. General Petroleum Co., 270 P. 952
(Cal. 1928).
The intent and purpose of the act is to prevent persons in the operation of oil and gas wells to
deposit oil ... in streams used by others for watering stock, and ... from allowing salt water to
escape from their wells and flow over the surface of the land of others. To hold that operators
could not flow salt water over the surface of land owned by them. .. would result in depriving
the owner of land of the right to use it to his own advantage, where such use would in no way
harm or injure others.
Tidal, 5 P.2d at 392.
298. See Weyhrauch, supra note 236, at 372.
299. See generally Oil Spill Casts Doubts on Deep Water Exploration, EcON. TIMES, Jun
13, 2010, http:lleconomictimes.indiatimes.comlarticleshow/6042891 .cms
300. See id. "In the future, it is inevitable that technology and risk will increase, not dimi-
nish, as 'easy' sources of oil are depleted and as the exploration effort moves into new and ever
more challenging frontiers." Id.
301. See Spotts, supra note 278. Siphoning systems used to remedy to the spill have
'never been tested at such depths." Id.
302. Id.
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E. The Value of the Activity Does Not Outweigh its Risk: Factor (f)
How desperate are we for oil? It is undisputed that oil has been the
most important source of energy in the world. 3 3 The Restatement describes
this factor as the prosperity the activity provides to the community." How-
ever, as we have seen, a Florida court rejected the "value to the community"
factor in Cities Service Co., reasoning that one who carries on the risky activ-
ity should bear the loss, rather than the victim who had no relation to the
activity other than being injured by it. 305 The conclusion is supported by the
approach of other jurisdictions considering the issue; many recent cases sug-
gest that the utility to the community is largely irrelevant.3°
What seems clear is that even after weighing oil's utility to the commu-
nity, such utility is largely outweighed by the extraordinary dangers of
deepwater oil drilling. BP and other petroleum companies will continue to
profit by extracting oil in the deepwater; but the carriers of such risky oil
drilling must bear any costs that may result when their activity goes wrong.
As discussed, the Restatement does not require the presence of all six
factors; 30 7 the presence of three to four factors is generally sufficient for a
court to impose strict liability.308 Here, all six factors weigh in favor of con-
sidering deep water oil drilling an abnormally dangerous activity. In short, it
is an easy case for strict liability.
V. CONCLUSION
Both water contamination and oil pollution are among the worst threats
to the environment that man can produce. Oil spills are almost always within
the exclusive control of the companies that operate the wells, and victims can
do little to guard against oil pollution or avoid damages resulting from it.
When the oil drilling operations are conducted in deep water, the likelihood
of harm increases, the resulting damages become monumental, and repairing
such damage is arduous, when not impossible. The Deepwater Horizon
alone has leaked into the water more than one hundred and forty million gal-
303. Ekpu, supra note 28, at 55; see C. TUGENDGART & A. HAMILTON, OIL: THE BIG
BUSINESS 1 (1975) in OPEC BULLETIN 55 (1994).
304. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 520 cmt. f (1977). For example, an oil well may
not be considered abnormally dangerous in Texas or Oklahoma because of the importance the
oil industry has to the local economy, whereas the same oil well in Indiana or California might
be found abnormally dangerous because it is a lesser industry in those areas. See id.
305. See id.
306. Boston, supra note 129, at 665.
307. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. f (1977).
308. Case, supra note 97, at 194.
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Ions of oil, and scientists continue to discuss how many more similar spills
our planet can endure.
Strict liability provides an incentive for oil companies to take appropri-
ate precautions to avoid such catastrophic events; or, in the least, it requires
them to bear the burden of the unavoidable accidents. Further, the doctrine
of abnormally dangerous activites appears to be the easiest way to determine
oil companies' strict liability-not requiring any showing of the defendant's
negligence and disallowing almost every defense.
Consistently applied throughout the United States, the doctrine is appli-
cable regardless of federal statutes that may already impose some sort of
liability. Federal law is but one of the many tools that can be used to keep
our waters clean. Additionally, state law must coexist and supplement feder-
al law in order to effectively protect the rights of citizens of the United
States-and more generally, those who receive a benefit from the sea.
Accordingly, a plaintiff may freely choose to recover under a common
law strict liability theory as the simplest and safest way to redress the envi-
ronmental damage caused by petroleum companies. Pursuant to the doctrine
of abnormally dangerous activities, as first established in Rylands v. Fletcher
and developed by the Restatements of Torts, deep water oil drilling qualifies
as an activity that, because of its dangerousness, should be subject to a strict
liability regimen.
This is especially true in Florida and in such jurisdictions where courts
are willing to consider as primary factors the magnitude of the danger
created by the activity and the fairness of making the carrier of the activity
liable. In the event of litigation in Florida, the mission will be easier. The
risks imposed on society as a result of offshore oil drilling are extreme, and
the victims are powerless and faultless with respect to the control and pre-
vention of the damages.
Finally, such a conclusion is strongly supported by those decisions that
have already considered oil drilling-regardless of the location-an abnor-
mally dangerous activity. Courts that have decided otherwise did not take
into account the actual dangerousness of the enterprise, and they will likely
reconsider the issue when faced with the additional risks imposed by the
inappropriate location. The Deepwater Horizon oil spill may be the best
place to start.
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